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Social	  Engineering	  in	  Non-­‐Linear	  Warfare	  In	  January	  2017,	  the	  FBI,	  NSA,	  DIA,	  and	  CIA	  coordinated	  their	  efforts	  as	  the	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  Community	  (IC),	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  National	  Intelligence,	  and	  published	  Intelligence	  Community	  Assessment:	  Assessing	  Russian	  Activities	  
and	  Intentions	  in	  Recent	  US	  Elections.	  This	  document	  is	  a	  declassified	  and	  redacted	  version	  of	  a	  highly	  classified	  assessment	  that	  was	  provided	  to	  President	  Obama,	  who	  subsequently	  approved	  it	  for	  public	  release.	  Although	  the	  IC	  rarely	  divulges	  such	  assessments,	  Obama	  administration	  officials	  deemed	  it	  highly	  important	  to	  provide	  the	  public	  with	  its	  contents	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  Russian	  interference	  in	  the	  2016	  United	  States	  presidential	  election	  (United	  States	  Intelligence	  Community,	  2017).	  	  The	  report	  came	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  allegations	  that	  Russia	  had	  taken	  down	  the	  Ukraine	  power	  grid	  with	  a	  spear-­‐phishing	  attack	  that	  began	  in	  March	  2015.	  “[…]	  emails	  to	  utility	  employees	  looked	  like	  they	  contained	  data	  about	  military	  mobilization.	  Workers	  who	  clicked	  MS	  Office	  files	  to	  ‘enable	  macros’	  infected	  their	  workstations	  with	  remote	  access	  Trojans,	  the	  hackers	  moved	  laterally	  through	  the	  network	  and	  finally	  stole	  the	  credentials	  to	  access	  the	  utilities’	  operations	  systems”	  (Sjowerman,	  2016,	  para.	  11).	  	  Russia	  has	  a	  lively	  history	  of	  non-­‐linear	  warfare.	  In	  2007,	  a	  disagreement	  between	  Estonia	  and	  Russia	  over	  the	  relocation	  of	  the	  “Bronze	  Soldier	  of	  Tallinn”	  statue	  and	  Russian	  war	  graves	  in	  Tallinn	  resulted	  in	  a	  series	  of	  massive	  coordinated	  cyber	  attacks	  on	  the	  Estonian	  public	  and	  private	  sectors,	  which	  put	  banks,	  parliament,	  ministries,	  newspapers,	  and	  TV	  stations	  offline	  (Rehman,	  2013).	  Before	  a	  shot	  was	  fired	  in	  the	  Georgian	  conflict	  in	  2008,	  Russian	  hackers	  began	  a	  cyber	  campaign	  that	  included	  the	  defacement	  of	  the	  Georgian	  parliament	  website	  and	  multiple	  denial	  of	  service	  attacks	  that	  took	  many	  other	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Georgian	  sites	  offline	  (Hollis,	  2011;	  Markoff,	  2008).	  Hollis	  (2011)	  points	  out,	  “The	  Russian-­‐Georgian	  war	  was	  quite	  historic	  and	  precedent	  setting	  for	  several	  reasons.	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  first	  case	  in	  history	  of	  a	  coordinated	  cyberspace	  domain	  attack	  synchronized	  with	  major	  combat	  actions	  in	  the	  other	  warfighting	  domains	  (consisting	  of	  Land,	  Air,	  Sea,	  and	  Space)”	  (pp.	  1-­‐2).	  Russia	  has	  long	  been	  known	  for	  a	  combined	  arms	  approach	  to	  war.	  The	  domains	  have	  evolved	  to	  now	  consist	  of	  Land,	  Air,	  Sea,	  Space	  and	  Cyberspace.	  The	  combined	  arms	  approach	  to	  warfare	  reaches	  back	  to	  the	  days	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  new	  focus	  on	  Cyberspace	  includes	  “The	  Russian	  Federation:	  Information	  Warfare	  Framework”	  (Carr,	  2011).	  
A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Cyber	  Warfare,	  Information	  Warfare,	  and	  Non-­‐Linear	  War	  Cyberwar	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  nation-­‐state	  versus	  nation-­‐state	  operation.	  In	  some	  cases,	  it	  appears	  that	  nation-­‐states	  have	  used	  patriotic	  hackers	  and	  hacker	  gangs	  to	  further	  their	  national	  interest.	  We	  refer	  to	  these	  actions	  as	  cyberwar	  as	  well.	  Cyberwar	  has	  recently	  become	  a	  hot	  button	  issue,	  with	  most	  of	  the	  blame	  for	  intrusions	  being	  directed	  to	  the	  Chinese	  government.	  What	  we	  today	  call	  cyberwar,	  however,	  is	  not	  new.	  In	  2003,	  an	  estimated	  three-­‐year	  period	  of	  coordinated	  attacks	  on	  American	  computer	  systems	  began	  (Bodmer,	  Kilger,	  Carpenter,	  &	  Jones,	  2012).	  The	  US	  government	  codenamed	  this	  series	  of	  attacks,	  which	  have	  been	  attributed	  to	  the	  Chinese	  government,	  as	  “Titan	  Rain”	  (Espiner,	  2005).	  	  Prior	  to	  this	  report,	  news	  headlines	  throughout	  the	  years	  have	  covered	  the	  use	  of	  new	  types	  of	  targeted	  weapons	  in	  what	  we	  now	  label	  as	  cyberwar.	  The	  most	  notable	  of	  these	  new	  “cyber	  weapons”	  is	  Stuxnet.	  The	  Stuxnet	  worm,	  a	  suspected	  US-­‐Israel	  joint	  operation,	  targeted	  centrifuges	  at	  the	  Natanz	  uranium	  enrichment	  plant	  in	  Iran,	  which	  set	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back	  the	  Iranian	  nuclear	  program	  for	  years	  and	  bypassed	  the	  need	  for	  conventional	  military	  intervention	  (Zetter,	  2011,	  2013).	  A	  subset	  of	  cyberwar	  is	  cyber	  espionage.	  In	  September	  2010,	  a	  number	  of	  Canadian-­‐based	  law	  firms	  were	  reportedly	  breached	  by	  China-­‐based	  hackers	  looking	  to	  derail	  the	  $40	  billion	  acquisition	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  potash	  producer	  by	  an	  Australian	  mining	  company	  (Riley	  &	  Pearson,	  2012).	  On	  February	  18,	  2013,	  the	  Internet	  security	  firm	  Mandiant	  released	  a	  report,	  which	  claimed	  that	  it	  had	  hard	  evidence	  that	  the	  Chinese	  army	  was	  responsible	  for	  supplicated	  intrusions	  into	  US	  networks	  to	  steal	  sensitive	  data	  and	  trade	  secrets	  from	  both	  governmental	  and	  nongovernmental	  organizations	  (McWhorter,	  2013).	  	  While	  these	  tactics	  are	  not	  new,	  Russia	  has	  in	  recent	  years	  leveraged	  cyber	  and	  information	  warfare	  into	  a	  non-­‐linear	  war	  against	  the	  West.	  The	  new	  strategy	  was	  identified	  by	  Pomerantsev	  (2014):	  The	  Kremlin’s	  approach	  might	  be	  called	  “non-­‐linear	  war,”	  a	  term	  used	  in	  a	  short	  story	  written	  by	  one	  of	  Putin’s	  closest	  political	  advisors,	  Vladislav	  Surkov,	  which	  was	  published	  under	  his	  pseudonym,	  Nathan	  Dubovitsky,	  just	  a	  few	  days	  before	  the	  annexation	  of	  Crimea.	  Surkov	  is	  credited	  with	  inventing	  the	  system	  of	  “managed	  democracy”	  that	  has	  dominated	  Russia	  in	  the	  21st	  century,	  and	  his	  new	  portfolio	  focuses	  on	  foreign	  policy.	  This	  time,	  he	  sets	  his	  new	  story	  in	  a	  dystopian	  future,	  after	  the	  “fifth	  world	  war”	  (para.	  2).	  	  Surkov	  writes:	  	  It	  was	  the	  first	  non-­‐linear	  war.	  In	  the	  primitive	  wars	  of	  the	  19th	  and	  20th	  centuries	  it	  was	  common	  for	  just	  two	  sides	  to	  fight.	  Two	  countries,	  two	  blocks	  of	  allies.	  Now	  four	  coalitions	  collided.	  Not	  two	  against	  two,	  or	  three	  against	  one.	  All	  against	  all	  (as	  cited	  in	  Pomerantsev,	  2014,	  para.	  3).	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The	  Democratic	  National	  Committee	  Breach	  In	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  Democratic	  National	  Committee,	  Russian	  hackers	  leveraged	  social	  engineering	  techniques	  to	  compromise	  the	  email	  of	  DNC	  official	  and	  Clinton	  campaign	  manager	  John	  Podesta,	  which	  is	  a	  key	  piece	  of	  the	  ongoing	  allegation	  that	  Russia	  used	  cyber	  and	  information	  warfare	  techniques	  to	  influence	  the	  2016	  U.S.	  elections	  (United	  States	  Intelligence	  Community,	  2017).	  Hackers	  do	  not	  break	  in	  through	  firewalls	  anymore;	  they	  now	  bypass	  them	  by	  targeting	  the	  user	  directly.	  Organizations	  have	  spent	  billions	  of	  dollars	  developing	  layered	  defenses	  against	  online	  attackers.	  Such	  protections	  include	  antivirus	  programs,	  intrusion	  detection	  systems,	  intrusion	  prevention	  systems,	  and	  other	  technical	  solutions	  to	  safeguard	  information.	  With	  these	  sophisticated	  solutions	  in	  place,	  attackers	  are	  now	  turning	  to	  more	  targeted	  methods	  focused	  on	  tricking	  users	  into	  clicking	  links	  or	  opening	  attachments	  Such	  tactics	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  social	  engineering,	  which	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  Social	  Engineering	  Framework	  (2017)	  as	  “any	  act	  that	  influences	  a	  person	  to	  take	  an	  action	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  in	  their	  best	  interest”	  (para.	  1).	  More	  specifically,	  this	  process	  entails	  deceiving	  people	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  restricted	  areas	  or	  systems	  and	  confidential	  information.	  In	  information	  security,	  humans	  are	  the	  weakest	  link.	  Employees	  generally	  wish	  to	  be	  helpful	  and	  provide	  good	  service	  to	  clients,	  vendors,	  and	  coworkers.	  People	  are	  also	  curious.	  Social	  engineers	  seek	  to	  exploit	  these	  characteristics	  in	  humans.	  	  Russia	  has	  adopted	  social	  engineering	  as	  a	  key	  component	  of	  non-­‐linear	  warfare.	  One	  recent	  example	  includes	  the	  events	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  DNC	  breach	  in	  March	  of	  last	  year.	  “Hillary	  Clinton's	  campaign	  chairman	  John	  Podesta	  received	  an	  alarming	  email	  that	  appeared	  to	  come	  from	  Google.	  The	  email,	  however,	  was	  actually	  an	  attempt	  to	  hack	  into	  his	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personal	  account.	  The	  message	  came	  from	  a	  group	  of	  hackers	  that	  security	  researchers,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  US	  government,	  believe	  are	  working	  for	  the	  Russian	  government.	  At	  the	  time,	  however,	  Podesta	  was	  unaware	  of	  the	  attack	  and	  clicked	  on	  the	  malicious	  link	  contained	  in	  the	  email,	  ultimately	  giving	  hackers	  access	  to	  his	  account”	  	  (“How	  Hackers	  Broke	  into,”	  2016).	  In	  October	  of	  2016,	  one	  month	  before	  the	  general	  election,	  WikiLeaks	  began	  publishing	  thousands	  of	  Podesta's	  hacked	  emails.	  (“How	  Hackers	  Broke	  into,”	  2016)	  After	  the	  Podesta	  email	  leak,	  investigators	  discovered	  evidence	  that	  pointed	  to	  the	  hack	  being	  backed	  by	  Russia.	  The	  malware	  used	  in	  the	  attack	  was	  dubbed	  Fancy	  Bear,	  APT28,	  or	  Sofacy,	  when	  they	  found	  a	  common	  thread	  of	  malware	  used	  in	  other	  DNC	  related	  leaks.	  These	  leaks	  appeared	  on	  a	  website	  named	  “DC	  Leaks”	  and	  included	  the	  hacked	  emails	  of	  Colin	  Powell.	  “All	  these	  hacks	  were	  done	  using	  the	  same	  tool:	  malicious	  short	  URLs	  hidden	  in	  fake	  Gmail	  messages.	  And	  those	  URLs,	  according	  to	  a	  security	  firm	  that	  has	  tracked	  them	  for	  a	  year,	  were	  created	  with	  Bitly	  accounts	  linked	  to	  a	  domain	  under	  the	  control	  of	  Fancy	  Bear.	  The	  phishing	  email	  that	  Podesta	  received	  on	  March	  19	  contained	  a	  URL,	  created	  with	  the	  popular	  Bitly	  shortening	  service,	  pointing	  to	  a	  longer	  URL	  that,	  to	  an	  untrained	  eye,	  looked	  like	  a	  Google	  link.”	  (“How	  Hackers	  Broke	  into,”	  2016)	  Below	  is	  an	  image1	  of	  the	  Bitly	  link	  used	  to	  compromise	  Podesta’s	  Gmail	  account.	  While	  it	  is	  not	  particularly	  well	  crafted,	  the	  link	  redirecting	  to	  the	  Bitly	  link	  was	  sufficient	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “A	  screenshot	  of	  the	  Bitly	  link	  used	  against	  John	  Podesta.”	  (2016).	  Motherboard.	  Retrieved	  from	  https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mg7xjb/how-­‐hackers-­‐broke-­‐into-­‐john-­‐podesta-­‐and-­‐colin-­‐powells-­‐gmail-­‐accounts	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enough	  to	  deceive	  Podesta	  into	  clicking	  and	  downloading	  the	  malware.	  
	  	  In	  2009,	  Google,	  Adobe,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  high-­‐profile	  companies	  were	  targeted	  in	  an	  attack	  that	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  Operation	  Aurora.	  The	  attack,	  which	  originated	  from	  China,	  was	  aimed	  at	  the	  intellectual	  property	  of	  targeted	  companies.	  This	  intellectual	  property	  included	  source	  code	  that	  controlled	  major	  systems,	  including	  Google’s	  Gmail	  service.	  The	  attackers	  then	  used	  the	  information	  gained	  through	  the	  breach	  to	  access	  the	  Gmail	  accounts	  of	  human	  rights	  activists	  (Zetter,	  2010).	  Dmitri	  Alperovitch,	  McAfee’s	  vice	  president	  of	  threat	  research	  commented,	  “We	  have	  never	  ever,	  outside	  of	  the	  defense	  industry,	  seen	  commercial	  industrial	  companies	  come	  under	  that	  level	  of	  sophisticated	  attack.	  It’s	  totally	  changing	  the	  threat	  model”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Zetter,	  2010,	  para.	  2).	  
How	  Social	  Engineering	  Works	  Not	  all	  social	  engineering	  attacks	  are	  designed	  to	  yield	  pieces	  of	  sensitive	  information,	  such	  as	  passwords.	  Some	  are	  meant	  to	  obtain	  a	  piece	  of	  information	  that	  seems	  insignificant	  to	  the	  target,	  such	  as	  the	  name	  of	  their	  cleaning	  company.	  The	  attacker	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uses	  these	  smaller	  pieces	  of	  information	  to	  create	  a	  cover	  story,	  or	  pretext,	  to	  perform	  an	  attack	  (Gardner	  &	  Thomas,	  2014).	  Social	  engineers	  examine	  the	  target’s	  website	  closely	  for	  some	  obvious	  reasons,	  such	  as	  identifying	  their	  industry	  and	  products/services.	  This	  can	  also	  be	  classified	  as	  open	  source	  intelligence	  gathering,	  as	  the	  attackers	  are	  using	  public	  sources	  to	  gather	  information.	  These	  sources	  include	  websites,	  annual	  reports,	  news	  stories,	  as	  well	  as	  publicly	  available	  government	  documents.	  Attackers	  will	  use	  an	  organization’s	  web	  site	  to	  gather	  the	  following	  information:	  
• Number	  of	  employees—It	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  social	  engineer	  an	  organization	  where	  everyone	  is	  on	  a	  first-­‐name	  basis.	  Difficult	  but	  not	  impossible.	  
• Locations—Understanding	  where	  the	  target’s	  offices	  are	  located	  is	  crucial.	  If	  the	  attacker	  is	  going	  to	  impersonate	  an	  employee	  from	  engineering,	  they	  want	  to	  be	  sure	  that	  their	  target	  is	  not	  sitting	  in	  the	  next	  cubicle.	  
• Job	  openings—Detailed	  postings	  provide	  insight	  into	  specific	  technologies	  that	  the	  target	  may	  be	  using,	  such	  as	  antivirus	  and	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  (IDS).	  Job	  postings	  also	  provide	  high-­‐level	  detail	  on	  where	  company	  departments	  are	  located.	  For	  example,	  three	  accounting	  jobs	  are	  posted	  with	  a	  location	  of	  Dallas.	  
• Names	  of	  executives	  and	  managers—This	  information	  can	  be	  used	  to	  draft	  an	  organizational	  chart.	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• E-­‐mail	  address	  format—Once	  an	  attacker	  knows	  the	  target’s	  e-­‐mail	  scheme,	  such	  as	  john.smith@abc.com,	  they	  can	  create	  e-­‐mail	  lists	  with	  names	  discovered	  from	  other	  sources.	  The	  user’s	  naming	  scheme	  in	  their	  e-­‐mail	  address	  can	  sometimes	  be	  the	  same	  format	  for	  their	  login	  username.	  
• Current	  events—Has	  the	  target	  company	  merged	  with	  another	  company	  recently?	  Posing	  as	  an	  employee	  from	  the	  newly	  acquired	  company	  could	  be	  a	  possible	  attack	  vector.	  Are	  they	  having	  any	  events	  that	  are	  open	  to	  the	  public?	  These	  events	  can	  be	  an	  opportunity	  to	  learn	  company	  lingo	  and	  observe	  their	  level	  of	  security	  awareness.	  	  Ultimately,	  attackers	  need	  a	  granular	  understanding	  of	  the	  target	  to	  pose	  as	  an	  employee	  or	  trusted	  insider.	  The	  company	  website	  is	  a	  valuable	  intelligence	  source,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  one.	  Social	  media	  websites	  are	  great	  for	  staying	  connected	  with	  friends	  and	  colleagues,	  and	  they	  are	  also	  fertile	  hunting	  ground	  for	  attackers.	  Facebook	  and	  Twitter	  often	  provide	  an	  in-­‐depth	  look	  into	  the	  personal	  lives	  of	  potential	  targets.	  In	  addition	  to	  a	  near	  real-­‐time	  update	  of	  an	  individual’s	  activities,	  other	  pieces	  of	  useful	  information	  can	  also	  be	  gleaned.	  Examples	  include	  	  
• names	  of	  family	  members;	  	  
• high	  school	  attended;	  
• birthday;	  
• names	  of	  pets;	  
• favorite	  color;	  
• hobbies	  or	  interests;	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The	  aforementioned	  items	  provide	  potential	  answers	  to	  password	  resets	  or	  other	  security-­‐related	  questions.	  These	  pieces	  of	  personal	  information	  also	  provide	  an	  attacker	  with	  potential	  attack	  vectors	  for	  infecting	  the	  victim’s	  computer.	  In	  addition	  to	  sites	  such	  as	  Facebook	  and	  Twitter,	  LinkedIn	  yields	  an	  even	  greater	  amount	  of	  particularly	  useful	  information.	  To	  a	  social	  engineer,	  the	  site	  is	  a	  shopping	  list	  for	  targets.	  The	  granular	  search	  options	  allow	  for	  filters	  such	  as	  current	  employer,	  previous	  employer,	  physical	  location,	  industry,	  and	  more.	  Want	  to	  know	  who	  works	  in	  the	  engineering	  department	  of	  the	  target	  company?	  With	  a	  premium	  LinkedIn	  account	  and	  a	  few	  tailored	  searches,	  a	  list	  is	  available	  in	  a	  matter	  of	  minutes.	  Better	  yet,	  most	  profiles	  include	  a	  partial	  resume	  detailing	  job	  duties	  and	  technical	  skills,	  which	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  defensive	  technologies	  in	  place	  at	  the	  target	  organization.	  Using	  any	  search	  engine	  of	  choice,	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  obtain	  “juicy”	  documents.	  These	  may	  contain	  internal	  information	  such	  as	  common	  acronyms,	  financial	  details,	  network	  diagrams,	  and	  other	  items	  of	  interest.	  Some	  refer	  to	  this	  process	  as	  “Google	  hacking”	  (Gardner	  &	  Thomas,	  2014).	  	  
Types	  of	  Social	  Engineering	  Attacks	  The	  RSA	  Advanced	  Threat	  Intelligence	  Team	  first	  defined	  Watering	  Hole	  attacks	  in	  2012.	  According	  to	  Gragido	  (2012),	  Watering	  Hole	  attacks	  have	  three	  phases:	  1. The	  victim	  visits	  a	  compromised	  “watering	  hole”	  website.	  2. This	  website,	  through	  an	  injected	  JavaScript	  element,	  redirects	  the	  visiting	  browser	  to	  an	  exploit	  site.	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3. This	  exploit	  site	  checks	  that	  the	  visiting	  machine	  is	  running	  a	  Windows	  operating	  system	  and	  a	  version	  of	  Internet	  Explorer,	  and	  then	  exploits	  the	  Java	  client	  on	  the	  visiting	  host,	  installing	  a	  ‘gh0st	  RAT’	  (Remote	  Access	  Trojan)	  variant.	  A	  recent	  example	  of	  a	  water	  hole,	  or	  watering	  hole,	  attack	  is	  the	  use	  of	  a	  compromised	  website	  containing	  the	  menu	  for	  a	  Chinese	  restaurant	  to	  serve	  exploits	  to	  a	  targeted	  oil	  company.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  attackers	  circumvented	  numerous	  sophisticated	  defensive	  measures	  that	  the	  company	  had	  paid	  a	  hefty	  sum	  to	  implement.	  	  “Unable	  to	  breach	  the	  computer	  network	  at	  a	  big	  oil	  company,	  hackers	  infected	  with	  malware	  the	  online	  menu	  of	  a	  Chinese	  restaurant	  that	  was	  popular	  with	  employees.	  When	  the	  workers	  browsed	  the	  menu,	  they	  inadvertently	  downloaded	  code	  that	  gave	  the	  attackers	  a	  foothold	  in	  the	  business’s	  vast	  computer	  network”	  (Perlroth,	  2014).	  Watering	  hole	  attacks,	  while	  not	  as	  common	  as	  phishing	  attacks,	  have	  increased	  in	  number	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years	  as	  users	  improve	  in	  spotting	  phishing	  attacks.	  Due	  to	  the	  requirement	  of	  compromising	  a	  site	  that	  the	  target	  regularly	  uses,	  which	  increases	  the	  complexity	  of	  carrying	  out	  the	  attack,	  watering	  hole	  attacks	  will	  likely	  never	  surpass	  spear	  phishing	  attacks	  in	  popularity.	  Phishing	  campaigns,	  such	  as	  the	  DNC	  Gmail	  are	  much	  less	  complex	  to	  execute.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  DNC	  breach,	  the	  attackers	  targeted	  Gmail.	  
Remote	  Access	  Trojans	  The	  common	  attack	  vectors	  in	  Operation	  Aurora,	  Operating	  Shady	  RAT	  (Remote	  Access	  Trojan),	  and	  the	  targeted	  attacks	  against	  RSA	  and	  defense	  contractors	  were	  all	  highly	  targeted	  spear	  phishing	  campaigns.	  This	  previously	  unknown	  malware	  siphoned	  
10
Journal of Applied Digital Evidence, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://mds.marshall.edu/jade/vol1/iss1/1
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
confidential	  information	  and	  intellectual	  property	  out	  of	  each	  organization.	  The	  other	  commonality	  is	  that	  these	  organizations	  have	  spent	  millions,	  if	  not	  tens	  of	  millions,	  of	  dollars	  on	  antivirus,	  intrusion	  detection	  systems,	  intrusion	  prevention	  systems,	  and	  other	  information	  security	  defenses	  only	  to	  have	  such	  measures	  internally	  circumvented.	  Someone	  inside	  of	  the	  organization	  simply	  opened	  a	  link	  or	  an	  attachment	  contained	  in	  an	  e-­‐mail,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  compromise	  of	  their	  entire	  enterprise	  networks.	  All	  organizations,	  regardless	  of	  size,	  contain	  information	  that	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  attackers−	  and	  they	  will	  use	  any	  means	  possible	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  it.	  Smaller	  breaches	  often	  go	  unreported	  because	  an	  organization	  is	  unaware	  of	  an	  intrusion	  or	  is	  reluctant	  to	  admit	  a	  data	  compromise	  to	  business	  partners	  and	  customers.	  While	  most	  social	  engineering	  attacks	  are	  nontechnical,	  the	  results	  can	  be	  disastrous	  for	  the	  target	  when	  these	  attacks	  are	  combined	  with	  technical	  methods.	  
Spear	  Phishing	  A	  similar	  approach	  was	  taken	  using	  spear	  phishing	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  compromise	  of	  Colin	  Powell’s	  Gmail	  account.	  An	  example	  screenshot2	  of	  the	  fake	  email	  used	  in	  this	  campaign	  is	  below.	  It	  has	  been	  reported	  that	  other	  journalists	  and	  key	  current	  and	  former	  US	  government	  employees	  have	  been	  targeted	  by	  the	  same	  malware.	  Security	  researchers	  also	  say	  that	  this	  malware	  points	  directly	  back	  at	  Moscow	  and	  an	  attempt	  to	  influence	  the	  US	  election	  cycle	  because	  of	  the	  type	  of	  malware	  used	  in	  the	  attacks.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  “A	  screenshot	  of	  a	  phishing	  email	  received	  by	  a	  Bellingcat	  journalist.”	  (2016).	  Motherboard.	  Retrieved	  from	  https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mg7xjb/how-­‐hackers-­‐broke-­‐into-­‐john-­‐podesta-­‐and-­‐colin-­‐powells-­‐gmail-­‐accounts	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  In	  general,	  a	  spear	  phishing	  message:	  	  
• addresses	  the	  recipient	  by	  name	  
• appears	  to	  be	  sent	  by	  a	  person	  or	  vendor	  that	  the	  recipient	  is	  familiar	  with	  	  
• includes	  a	  proper	  signature	  block	  with	  logo	  and	  contact	  information	  
• often	  includes	  an	  infected	  attachment	  
• can	  contain	  a	  link	  to	  a	  website	  similar	  to	  the	  sender’s	  (abcbank.com	  instead	  of	  abc-­‐bank.com)	  While	  other	  phishing	  e-­‐mails	  are	  sent	  in	  large	  quantities,	  spear	  phishing	  e-­‐mails	  are	  sent	  to	  very	  few	  employees—usually	  less	  than	  five.	  However,	  the	  additional	  time	  spent	  researching	  usually	  pays	  off,	  as	  spear	  phishing	  messages	  have	  the	  highest	  rate	  of	  success.	  Phishing	  messages	  are	  normally	  crafted	  to	  include	  the	  following	  key	  elements:	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• An	  attention-­‐grabbing	  subject	  
• A	  sense	  of	  urgency	  in	  the	  message	  body	  that	  will	  motivate	  the	  recipient	  to	  take	  action	  
• Logos	  and	  other	  applicable	  images	  
• Sender’s	  name	  and	  email	  address	  match	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  email	  
• A	  complete	  signature	  block,	  if	  the	  email	  appears	  to	  originate	  from	  a	  person	  
• A	  privacy	  statement	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  e-­‐mail,	  if	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  automatically	  generated	  Unless	  attackers	  are	  performing	  an	  attack	  with	  an	  attachment,	  the	  email	  will	  include	  a	  link	  for	  the	  target	  to	  click.	  The	  appearance	  of	  the	  link,	  or	  uniform	  resource	  locator	  (URL),	  plays	  an	  important	  role.	  If	  the	  URL	  looks	  suspicious	  or	  misspelled,	  employees	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  click.	  Graphic	  editing	  tools	  allow	  users	  to	  easily	  modify	  the	  display	  text	  of	  a	  URL	  so	  it	  deceptively	  appears	  as	  http://abc.com,	  but	  once	  clicked	  goes	  to	  http://cba.com.	  Using	  this	  technique	  will	  educate	  your	  employees	  on	  URL	  modification	  and	  how	  to	  verify	  a	  link’s	  true	  destination	  before	  clicking.	  These	  tools	  and	  techniques	  are	  used	  by	  both	  attackers	  to	  attack	  networks	  and	  by	  defenders	  to	  test	  their	  networks	  before	  they	  experience	  a	  breach	  (Gardner	  &	  Thomas,	  2014).	  
What	  Went	  Wrong	  at	  the	  Democratic	  National	  Committee	  	  It	  appears	  the	  DNC	  did	  not	  have	  any	  sort	  of	  information	  security	  program	  in	  place	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  breach.	  It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  attackers	  went	  after	  private	  email	  accounts	  hosted	  by	  Google.	  The	  attackers	  used	  open	  source	  intelligence	  to	  find	  these	  Gmail	  addresses	  and	  then	  constructed	  attention-­‐grabbing	  phishing	  email	  causing	  the	  targets	  to	  become	  compromised.	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According	  to	  the	  US	  Intelligence	  Community	  (2017),	  the	  release	  of	  the	  hacked	  email	  was	  part	  of	  a	  much	  larger	  campaign	  being	  used	  by	  the	  Russians	  to	  attempt	  to	  influence	  the	  2016	  U.S.	  presidential	  campaign.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  assessment	  states:	  	  Russian	  efforts	  to	  influence	  the	  2016	  US	  presidential	  election	  represent	  the	  most	  recent	  expression	  of	  Moscow’s	  longstanding	  desire	  to	  undermine	  the	  US-­‐led	  liberal	  democratic	  order,	  but	  these	  activities	  demonstrated	  a	  significant	  escalation	  in	  directness,	  level	  of	  activity,	  and	  scope	  of	  effort	  compared	  to	  previous	  operations	  (p.	  ii).	   	  In	  further	  detail,	  the	  US	  Intelligence	  Community	  (2017)	  reports:	  We	  assess	  Russian	  President	  Vladimir	  Putin	  ordered	  an	  influence	  campaign	  in	  2016	  aimed	  at	  the	  US	  presidential	  election.	  Russia’s	  goals	  were	  to	  undermine	  public	  faith	  in	  the	  US	  democratic	  process,	  denigrate	  Secretary	  Clinton,	  and	  harm	  her	  electability	  and	  potential	  presidency.	  We	  further	  assess	  Putin	  and	  the	  Russian	  Government	  developed	  a	  clear	  preference	  for	  President-­‐elect	  Trump.	  We	  have	  high	  confidence	  in	  these	  judgments	  (p.ii).	  	  
Hactivism	  The	  Russians	  also	  began	  adopting	  tactics	  long	  used	  by	  hacktivist	  groups	  such	  as	  Anonymous.	  Hacktivists	  act	  with	  political	  motivations.	  Hacktivism	  is	  defined	  as	  “the	  nonviolent	  use	  of	  illegal	  or	  legally	  ambiguous	  digital	  tools	  in	  pursuit	  of	  political	  ends.	  These	  tools	  include	  web	  site	  defacements,	  redirects,	  denial-­‐of-­‐service	  attacks,	  information	  theft	  (Samuel,	  2004).	  	  There	  are	  many	  different	  examples	  of	  hacktivism,	  but	  the	  largest,	  most	  successful,	  and	  most	  well-­‐known	  was	  Operation	  Sony,	  also	  known	  as	  Op	  Sony.	  The	  operation	  involved	  a	  denial	  of	  service	  attack	  and	  compromise	  of	  Sony’s	  online	  services.	  At	  the	  center	  of	  the	  case	  was	  a	  hacker	  by	  the	  name	  of	  George	  Hotz,	  also	  known	  as	  GeoHot.	  Hotz	  was	  the	  first	  hacker	  to	  “jailbreak”	  the	  iPhone,	  which	  allows	  users	  to	  play	  and	  share	  homemade	  games	  (Brad,	  2011).	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On	  December	  29th,	  2010,	  Hotz	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  hacker	  collective	  known	  as	  fail0verflow	  announced	  they	  had	  retrieved	  the	  root	  key	  of	  Sony’s	  PlayStation	  3	  gaming	  console	  and	  subsequently	  published	  the	  findings	  on	  a	  personal	  website.	  On	  January	  11th,	  2011,	  Sony	  filed	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  Hotz	  and	  other	  members	  of	  fail0verflow	  for	  releasing	  the	  PlayStation	  3’s	  root	  key	  (Brad,	  2011).	  In	  April	  2011,	  Anonymous	  fired	  the	  first	  salvo	  in	  what	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  Op	  Sony,	  by	  taking	  the	  PlayStation	  Network	  (PSN)	  and	  several	  PlayStation-­‐related	  domains,	  including	  the	  PlayStation	  Store,	  offline.	  It	  was	  later	  learned	  that	  the	  attacks	  not	  only	  resulted	  in	  an	  outage	  of	  the	  PSN	  service	  but	  also	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  data	  breaches	  in	  history	  involving	  over	  70	  million	  records	  including	  personally	  identifiable	  information	  (PII)	  and	  credit	  card	  information	  (Ragan,	  2011).	  This	  period	  of	  time	  also	  saw	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  subgroup	  of	  Anonymous	  known	  as	  LulzSec.	  This	  brash	  subgroup	  of	  Anonymous	  ultimately	  took	  credit	  for	  stealing	  24.6	  million	  records	  in	  the	  PlayStation	  Network	  (Arthur,	  2013).	  The	  group	  then	  went	  on	  an	  extensive	  hacking	  spree	  that	  involved	  a	  number	  of	  high-­‐profile	  targets,	  including	  Fox.com,	  PBS,	  and	  the	  game	  company	  Bethesda	  Game	  Studios.	  The	  group	  saw	  themselves	  as	  modern-­‐day	  Robin	  Hoods	  that	  were	  exposing	  the	  insecurities	  of	  the	  websites	  they	  breached.	  As	  their	  hacking	  spree	  continued,	  and	  became	  more	  brazen	  and	  outlandish,	  they	  garnered	  increasing	  public	  and	  law	  enforcement	  attention	  throughout	  the	  summer	  of	  2011.	  	  
Russian	  Hackers	  and	  the	  Alt-­‐Right	  The	  same	  Russian	  hackers	  who	  compromised	  the	  DNC	  were	  later	  linked	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  “fake	  news”	  (Winter,	  2017).	  	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  information	  warfare	  campaign	  according	  to	  U.S.	  intelligence	  agencies	  was	  to	  further	  exploit	  the	  virtual	  beachhead	  of	  the	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DNC	  hacks	  and	  subsequent	  leaks	  of	  the	  confidential	  information	  related	  to	  the	  Clinton	  campaign	  and	  the	  DNC	  which	  put	  both	  organizations	  in	  a	  negative	  light.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Alt-­‐Right	  (“Alternative	  Right,”	  n.d.;	  Bokhari	  &	  Yiannopoulos,	  2016)	  began	  to	  use	  the	  well-­‐known	  hacktivist	  tactic	  of	  using	  memes	  and	  internet	  rumors	  to	  further	  spread	  negative	  stories	  about	  Clinton	  and	  the	  DNC.	  Most	  famously,	  Pepe	  the	  Frog,	  which	  for	  years	  had	  been	  a	  harmless	  meme	  spread	  across	  4Chan	  and	  other	  Internet	  message	  boards,	  became	  a	  weaponized,	  racist	  symbol	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Alt-­‐Right	  (Roy,	  2016).	  With	  the	  introduction	  of	  memes,	  the	  attackers	  also	  began	  to	  engage	  in	  acts	  of	  trolling	  related	  to	  the	  memes.	  Trolling	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  deliberate	  spreading	  of	  false	  and	  inflammatory	  information	  to	  cause	  upset	  to	  people	  (Coleman,	  2015).	  Trolling	  for	  political	  means	  has	  been	  used	  by	  hacktivist	  groups	  in	  the	  past	  to	  attempt	  to	  equalize	  the	  political	  power	  differential	  for	  those	  who	  feel	  political	  oppression	  or	  for	  the	  victims	  of	  social	  and	  political	  injustice.	  To	  paraphrase	  Peter	  Ludlow	  in	  The	  Hacker	  Wars	  (2014):	  The	  purpose	  of	  trolling	  is	  to	  embarrass	  the	  power	  elite.	  Some	  trolls	  argue	  trolling	  is	  in	  the	  Socratic	  tradition.	  	  Groups	  such	  as	  Anonymous	  to	  push	  an	  anarchist/social	  justice	  agenda	  have	  used	  Hacktivist	  tactics,	  mainly	  trolling	  and	  memes,	  in	  the	  past.	  According	  to	  the	  US	  Intelligence	  Community	  (2017),	  Russian	  hackers,	  both	  those	  employed	  by	  the	  Russian	  military	  and	  their	  surrogates,	  have	  utilized	  these	  “weapons	  of	  the	  geek”	  in	  combination	  with	  spreading	  propaganda	  to	  influence	  the	  election	  in	  favor	  of	  Donald	  J.	  Trump.	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Attribution	  The	  US	  Intelligence	  Community	  (2017)	  also	  describes	  Russia’s	  use	  of	  trolls	  and	  trolling	  as	  a	  part	  of	  its	  propaganda	  efforts.	  It	  was	  assessed	  that	  such	  campaigns	  likely	  financed	  professional	  trolls	  who	  are	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Internet	  Research	  Agency,	  an	  organization	  based	  in	  Saint	  Petersburg.	  	  Beyond	  the	  Russian	  trolling	  connection	  there	  are	  trolling	  communities,	  such	  as	  4chan	  (Beran,	  2017),	  and	  a	  particularly	  famous	  Internet	  troll	  known	  as	  Weev,	  whose	  real	  name	  is	  Andrew	  Auernheimer.	  Weev	  is	  a	  hacker	  folk	  hero	  due	  to	  his	  legal	  battles	  with	  AT&T	  (O’Neill,	  2014).	  The	  AT&T	  case	  resulted	  in	  a	  prison	  sentence	  for	  Weev,	  but	  he	  was	  later	  released	  on	  a	  legal	  technicality	  (Zetter,	  2014).	  After	  his	  release,	  Weev	  left	  the	  US	  and	  spent	  time	  living	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  Serbia	  before	  taking	  up	  residence	  in	  eastern	  Ukraine	  where	  he	  found	  financiers	  who	  shared	  his	  white	  nationalist	  views	  (Hacker	  "weev"	  has	  left,	  2014).	  From	  there,	  Weev−	  who	  is	  now	  known	  as	  the	  “King	  of	  the	  Internet	  Trolls”	  (Coleman,	  2015)	  −	  became	  an	  unofficial	  part	  of	  the	  Russian	  propaganda	  machine	  through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  online	  publication	  Daily	  Stormer	  as	  his	  message	  platform.	  By	  using	  proxy	  hackers	  such	  as	  Guccifer	  2.0,	  who	  claimed	  responsibility	  for	  the	  DNC	  breach	  (Guccifer2,	  2016)	  and	  subsequent	  information	  leak	  to	  WikiLeaks,	  Russia’s	  contact	  and	  influence	  in	  the	  criminal	  hacker	  underground	  and	  organized	  crime	  is	  well	  documented	  (Nakashima,	  2017).	  The	  use	  of	  these	  assets	  allows	  Russia	  to	  create	  plausible	  deniability	  and	  distance	  from	  targets.	  Russia	  has	  also	  managed	  to	  exploit	  the	  hacker	  ethic	  of	  “All	  information	  should	  be	  free”	  (Levy,	  1984,	  p.	  458)	  as	  an	  avenue	  to	  leak	  stolen	  information	  to	  WikiLeaks,	  incorporating	  the	  organization	  as	  another	  part	  of	  the	  Russian	  propaganda	  machine	  (Boot,	  2017).	  This	  new	  adoption	  of	  tools	  and	  techniques	  formerly	  used	  by	  hacktivists	  have	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allowed	  Russian	  influence	  to	  spread	  beyond	  its	  own	  network	  of	  underground	  hackers	  to	  the	  hacker	  mainstream	  and	  has	  managed	  to	  unwittingly	  enlist	  anti-­‐establishment	  hacker	  groups	  and	  organizations,	  such	  as	  WikiLeaks	  and	  4chan,	  as	  mouthpieces	  for	  Russian	  propaganda−	  and	  to	  affect	  the	  outcome	  of	  US	  elections.	  In	  December	  of	  2016,	  U.S.	  cybersecurity	  firm	  CrowdStrike	  reported	  that	  Russia	  hacked	  into	  a	  Ukrainian	  artillery	  Android	  application	  using	  the	  Fancy	  Bear	  malware−	  the	  same	  malware	  used	  in	  the	  DNC	  breach−and	  resulted	  in	  heavy	  losses	  of	  D-­‐30	  Howitzers	  in	  Ukraine’s	  war	  with	  Russian-­‐backed	  separatists	  (ClowdStrike	  Global	  Intelligence	  Team,	  2016).	  	  While	  this	  is	  the	  only	  publicly	  reported	  use	  of	  this	  Russian-­‐based	  malware	  on	  the	  battlefield,	  it	  does	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  current	  and	  future	  use	  of	  such	  malware	  to	  gain	  a	  strategic	  edge	  on	  the	  kinetic	  battlefield.	  As	  such,	  military	  personnel−	  particularly	  in	  the	  Baltic	  states	  and	  Ukraine−	  should	  be	  aware	  of	  this	  threat	  and	  take	  preventative	  measures	  to	  avoid	  being	  infected	  with	  this	  type	  of	  malware.	  
Defending	  Against	  Social	  Engineering	  While	  most	  people	  think	  of	  the	  traditional	  sites	  for	  social	  networking,	  such	  as	  Twitter	  and	  Facebook,	  there	  are	  hundreds	  of	  additional	  sites	  that	  are	  potentially	  being	  used	  (Mehra,	  2011,	  2015).	  Beyond	  data	  leakage,	  these	  sites	  can	  house	  malware.	  Because	  anyone	  can	  typically	  upload	  any	  code	  they	  wish	  to	  these	  sites,	  social	  media	  sites	  have	  been	  the	  points	  of	  infections	  for	  zero	  days	  in	  the	  past	  (Mimoso,	  2014).	  With	  the	  prevalent	  use	  of	  social	  media	  in	  originations	  at	  all	  levels,	  informing	  users	  of	  the	  threats	  that	  exist	  on	  social	  media	  platforms	  and	  how	  to	  detect	  and	  avoid	  them	  is	  especially	  important.	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It	  is	  critical	  to	  emphasize	  to	  employees	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  personal	  information	  that	  is	  collected	  for	  payroll	  and	  insurance	  purposes	  by	  the	  organization.	  When	  the	  risk	  is	  made	  personal,	  employees	  become	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  securing	  the	  organization’s	  data	  because	  a	  breach	  may	  affect	  them	  as	  well.	  People	  check	  their	  bank	  accounts	  from	  work,	  shop	  from	  work,	  and	  have	  pictures	  of	  their	  loved	  ones	  stored	  on	  their	  computer.	  How	  would	  they	  feel	  if	  the	  flight	  reservations	  of	  their	  college-­‐aged	  daughter	  ended	  up	  in	  the	  wrong	  hands?	  When	  risks	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  a	  breach	  are	  personalized,	  compliance	  with	  policies	  that	  keeps	  information	  safe	  will	  increase.	  No	  matter	  what	  our	  position	  in	  our	  respective	  organizations,	  we	  are	  all	  network	  defenders.	  The	  only	  real	  defense	  against	  social	  engineering	  is	  awareness	  training.	  However,	  most	  training	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  lectures	  and,	  sadly,	  the	  lecture	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  effective	  teaching	  tool.	  Few	  enjoy	  a	  lecture,	  except	  for	  perhaps	  the	  individual	  giving	  it.	  For	  the	  lecturer,	  the	  act	  of	  giving	  a	  lecture	  is	  an	  active	  exercise.	  For	  attendees,	  the	  lecture	  is	  a	  passive	  exercise.	  Passive	  learning	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  to	  be	  less	  effective	  than	  active	  learning	  when	  conveying	  information.	  In	  fact,	  many	  in	  higher	  education	  claim	  that	  the	  lecture,	  a	  centuries-­‐old	  teaching	  technique,	  is	  dead	  (Gunderman,	  2013).	  For	  a	  more	  effective	  training	  approach,	  research	  demonstrates	  that	  we	  should	  do	  something	  that	  universities	  have	  been	  moving	  toward	  in	  the	  past	  few	  years:	  replacing	  passive	  learning	  with	  active	  learning.	  Active	  learning,	  depending	  on	  how	  it	  is	  implemented,	  has	  become	  known	  as	  “peer	  instruction”	  or	  “interactive	  learning.”	  These	  techniques	  make	  students	  responsible	  for	  their	  own	  learning	  and	  fosters	  interaction	  between	  students	  as	  they	  engage	  the	  material	  to	  be	  learned	  (Lambert,	  2012).	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“Peer	  instruction”	  and	  “interactive	  learning”	  take	  the	  form	  of	  giving	  students	  reading	  assignments,	  and	  then	  splitting	  the	  students	  into	  groups	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  material.	  These	  interactions	  involve	  writing	  assignments,	  group	  discussion,	  completing	  assigned	  tasks	  as	  a	  team,	  and	  sometimes	  a	  group	  grade.	  	  S	  ometimes,	  students	  play	  question	  and	  answer	  games	  based	  in	  popular	  game	  show	  formats	  to	  engage	  the	  material.	  Points	  can	  be	  awarded	  in	  candy	  or	  toward	  a	  group	  grade	  (Jaramilla,	  n.d.).	  It	  is	  clear	  the	  current	  training	  administered	  to	  employees	  is	  ineffective,	  as	  examples	  of	  breaches	  that	  involve	  exploiting	  humans	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  data	  occur	  on	  a	  nearly	  daily	  basis.	  Users	  are	  also	  exhibiting	  signs	  of	  message	  malaise;	  most	  think	  they	  will	  never	  be	  tricked	  into	  clicking	  on	  a	  link	  or	  opening	  an	  attachment	  because	  they	  view	  themselves	  as	  savvy	  Internet	  users.	  Schneier	  (2013)	  asserts	  that	  funds	  spent	  on	  user	  awareness	  training	  would	  be	  better	  spent	  on	  better	  system	  design.	  This	  argument	  caused	  a	  firestorm	  in	  information	  security	  circles,	  and	  while	  some	  agree	  with	  the	  notion,	  many	  do	  not	  (Kennedy,	  2013;	  Poniatowski,	  2013).	  Everyone,	  however,	  agrees	  that	  something	  must	  be	  done.	  Even	  Schneier	  (2000)	  states,	  “Security	  is	  a	  process,	  not	  a	  product”	  (para.	  3).	  If	  we	  never	  inform	  end	  users	  of	  threats,	  they	  will	  never	  know	  about	  them.	  Security	  awareness	  has	  a	  lot	  in	  common	  with	  other	  awareness	  campaigns.	  Other	  awareness	  campaigns	  use	  memorable	  spokesmen	  like	  Smokey	  the	  Bear	  and	  McGruff	  the	  Crime	  Dog.	  They	  also	  involved	  memorable	  slogans	  like	  “Only	  you	  can	  prevent	  forest	  fires,”	  and	  “Take	  a	  bite	  out	  of	  crime.”	  In	  the	  field	  of	  information	  security	  awareness,	  we	  fail	  at	  these	  two	  simple	  goals	  because	  we	  continue	  to	  have	  debates	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  security	  awareness	  programs.	  
20
Journal of Applied Digital Evidence, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://mds.marshall.edu/jade/vol1/iss1/1
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
The	  process	  of	  security	  is	  a	  long	  hard	  road	  that	  begins	  with	  getting	  management	  buy-­‐in,	  drafting	  and	  enforcing	  policies	  that	  give	  the	  user	  expectations	  of	  what	  they	  can	  and	  cannot	  do	  with	  the	  organization's	  technological	  resources,	  building	  an	  effective	  security	  awareness	  program,	  and	  then	  measuring	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  that	  program	  using	  meaningful	  metrics.	  Once	  metrics	  are	  gathered	  and	  processed,	  the	  cycle	  begins	  again	  with	  a	  review	  of	  policies,	  awareness	  program,	  and	  metrics,	  and	  changes	  are	  made	  based	  on	  the	  organization’s	  needs.	  	  While	  there	  is	  value	  in	  making	  sure	  your	  organization	  has	  the	  latest	  security	  products	  and	  that	  your	  IT	  staff	  has	  proper	  security	  training,	  it	  is	  a	  waste	  of	  time	  and	  money	  if	  you	  ignore	  the	  human	  factor.	  Next-­‐generation	  firewalls,	  antivirus,	  intrusion	  detection	  systems,	  intrusion	  prevention	  systems,	  and	  web	  application	  firewalls	  are	  all	  great	  productions,	  but	  these	  products	  do	  not	  provide	  protection	  against	  an	  employee	  making	  a	  poor	  decision	  about	  clicking	  links,	  opening	  attachments,	  and	  other	  nontechnical	  attacks	  employed	  by	  social	  engineers	  (Gardner	  &	  Thomas,	  2014).	  People	  have	  different	  learning	  styles	  based	  upon	  generational	  and	  educational	  background.	  The	  current	  generation	  entering	  the	  workforce	  learns	  much	  differently	  than	  those	  entering	  the	  workforce	  thirty	  years	  ago.	  Some	  individuals	  learn	  better	  from	  reading,	  others	  are	  visual	  learners,	  and	  some	  learn	  best	  from	  listening	  (Pashler,	  Mcdaniel,	  Rohrer,	  &	  Bjork,	  2008).	  	  The	  best	  strategy	  is	  to	  teach	  is	  a	  mixture	  of	  learning	  (Kramer-­‐Koehler,	  Tooney,	  &	  Beke,1995;	  Korwin	  &	  Jones,1990)	  or	  example,	  instead	  of	  lecturing	  users	  on	  what	  a	  good	  password	  policy	  is,	  ask	  them	  if	  they	  can	  explain	  the	  best	  practices	  for	  passwords	  and	  discuss	  what	  constitutes	  a	  good	  password.	  Another	  example	  entails	  trainees	  discussing	  the	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types	  of	  malware	  they	  have	  encountered	  in	  the	  past,	  how	  they	  think	  the	  infection(s)	  occurred,	  and	  what	  they	  think	  the	  attacker	  was	  after.	  Such	  exercises	  will	  aid	  in	  demonstrating	  to	  users	  that	  malware	  is	  not	  just	  an	  inconvenience	  that	  slows	  down	  their	  computer,	  but	  is	  an	  attempt	  by	  online	  criminals	  to	  steal	  data	  from	  their	  computers	  and/or	  to	  use	  their	  computer	  as	  part	  of	  a	  botnet,	  to	  hide	  child	  pornography	  and	  other	  contraband,	  or	  to	  gain	  a	  foothold	  in	  organization’s	  network.	  Another	  possible	  exercise	  comes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  instructing	  trainees	  to	  read	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  organization’s	  security	  policies,	  reflect	  on	  why	  the	  policy	  is	  in	  place,	  and	  question	  why	  such	  a	  policy	  is	  needed.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Russia's	  ongoing	  campaign	  to	  influence	  policy	  in	  not	  just	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  in	  the	  also	  the	  policies	  of	  US	  allies,	  information	  security	  awareness	  training	  is	  more	  important	  than	  ever.	  This	  ongoing	  campaign	  is	  clear	  and	  present	  danger	  and	  could	  be	  the	  greatest	  national	  security	  threat	  facing	  the	  NATO	  and	  the	  West	  (“GCHQ	  warns	  politicians”,	  2017;	  Kagan,	  2017;	  US	  Intelligence	  Community,	  2017).	  
Conclusion	  The	  nation-­‐state	  of	  Russia	  has	  adopted	  non-­‐nation-­‐state	  hacktivist	  tactics,	  such	  as	  trolling,	  hacking,	  leaking,	  and	  spreading	  false	  news,	  to	  influence	  elections	  in	  other	  countries.	  While	  information	  warfare	  and	  cyber	  warfare	  are	  not	  new,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  techniques	  by	  nation-­‐state	  actors	  is.	  This	  new	  form	  of	  non-­‐linear	  warfare	  has	  been	  perfected	  by	  Russia	  and	  was	  used	  to	  influence	  the	  2016	  US	  presidential	  election.	  It	  is	  likely	  Russia	  and	  other	  countries	  will	  continue	  to	  adopt	  and	  adapt	  these	  hacktivist	  tactics	  in	  the	  future.	  	  Because	  the	  malware	  used	  in	  the	  DNC	  hack	  was	  also	  found	  on	  the	  battlefield	  of	  the	  Ukraine	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  this	  sort	  of	  theatre	  specific	  malware	  attacks	  will	  become	  more	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common	  by	  Russia	  and	  other	  nation-­‐states.	  As	  a	  result,	  nation-­‐state	  defenders	  need	  to	  implement	  nontechnical	  defenses	  such	  as	  security	  awareness	  training	  as	  well	  as	  technical	  defenses.	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